What is up with our next year’s budget?
The official 2026 Government Work Plan (RKP) and State Budget (APBN) are still nowhere to be found
The author is a policy analyst at Bappenas. This article first appeared in Notes on Nusantara in Bahasa Indonesia. It reflects the author’s own analysis and views and does not necessarily represent those of The Reformist or Bappenas.
Just a few weeks before the year ends, Indonesia’s 2026 Government Work Plan (RKP) and State Budget (APBN) are still nowhere to be found, at least not publicly. At the time of writing, there is no public information on the promulgation of the Presidential Regulation on the 2026 RKP, nor on the promulgation of the 2026 APBN Law.
Both documents are central to Indonesia’s annual planning and budgeting cycle. They signal the government’s policy direction for the year ahead. But for 2026, they appear to be moving on an unusual timeline.
By this point in previous years, the public could reasonably expect the Presidential Regulation on the RKP, the APBN Law, and the Presidential Regulation on the Budget Details to have been promulgated, allowing ministries and agencies to prepare for execution.
This delay becomes even more consequential when seen against a year marked by the ‘efficiency’ measures and the public reactions surrounding them. The budget efficiency policy reflects not only ongoing debates over national priorities, but also the frictions of inter-period transition and coordination.
This article examines how the delayed promulgation of the 2026 RKP and APBN—together with the turbulence around this administration’s efficiency measures early in the year—reflects the broader process of transition, adjustment, and recalibration of the government’s annual planning cycle.
(Not so) smooth transition?
The 2025 RKP and APBN were drafted in 2024, under the previous administration. At that time, the current administration was not yet sworn into office. This administrative hurdle extended beyond the presidency, but to the entire apparatus of ministries and agencies, which were not necessarily led by the officials who hold those positions today. As a result, the new administration’s policy direction could not be fully translated into the 2025 planning and budgeting documents.
Signs of this transitional posture were evident: the 2025–2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) was finalized later than in the past four cycles, the rapid corrections introduced through the 2025 efficiency measures, and the updated 2025 RKP was issued only at the end of July 2025. With this in mind, the adjustments throughout 2025 can be read as the complexity of administrative handover and shifting policy orientation.
Intuitively, retaining political coalitions is often assumed as a benchmark for a smooth transition. Yet, even with the President’s coalition consisting of 7 out of 8 political parties in the House of Representatives, the government’s efficiency measures introduced after taking office signal otherwise.
Both the 2025 budget and its plan were produced under a technocratic and political environment that had been relatively stable for eight years. Meanwhile, through public channels and campaign pledges, the new administration introduced new priorities. But upon taking office, it faced not a blank canvas, but a highly structured fiscal architecture, ongoing contractual commitments, and a bureaucracy oriented around inter-period continuity.
This is where governance tensions begin to surface. New goals point toward tomorrow, but the machinery of government runs on frameworks built yesterday. The 2025 Efficiency measures can be read as an early response to this tension—and a test of the administration’s operational readiness.
Plan as we go
In Indonesia’s planning and budgeting system, the current year is not only for implementation; it is also the workspace for drafting the following year’s plan and budget. Throughout 2025, while the state budget is executed, the following year’s RKP and APBN are being simultaneously prepared.
For the first time under the current administration, the entire planning and budgeting cycle sits within its own political mandate, free from the shadow of a previous administration’s direction.
Historically, institutional timelines have been stable. The RKP is usually issued before or around the start of budget discussions in parliament. The APBN is promulgated with sufficient time for ministries to detail the budget and finalize the RKP. This cadence anchors certainty for ministries, local governments, businesses, and the public.
Substantively, the 2026 RKP has already been discussed with the Budget Committee and reported to the House plenary on 24 July 2025. In every previous year, the RKP was issued before the APBN, in line with Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning System and Law No. 17/2003 State Finance Law, which positions the RKP as the basis for the APBN.
Additionally, even though a government regulation mandates that the RKP be issued by June, in practice it has always been issued in either August or September. In that sense, perhaps the 2026 RKP has already been signed but is yet to be published.
According to the State Secretariat website, at the time of writing this article, the existing Presidential Regulation numbers were incomplete. These include Presidential Regulations 66, 68-79, 82, 93, 95-96, 98, 101, and 103-112. Presidential Regulation 113/2025 is the latest Presidential Regulation, enacted on 24 October 2025.
If a Presidential Regulation on the RKP has indeed been ratified but not yet made public, this raises further questions on fulfilling regulatory transparency regarding the government’s delivery of legislation through the public’s most accessible medium: the internet.
Meanwhile, the 2026 Draft Budget (RAPBN) has already been approved by the DPR during the 23 September 2025 plenary session, as required by the State Finance Law. Under the Constitution, the APBN Law should have been publicly announced by the end of October, signed or unsigned by the President. Again, perhaps it has been made but not made public.
Regardless, the agreed 2026 budget plan suggests that substantive agreement between the country’s political elites has already been reached. But without official promulgation or publication, the usual procedural rhythm breaks down. From the outside, the issue appears more administrative than political. Still, procedural delays can have real impacts on government operations.
With shrinking time comes operational risks
If this is merely an administrative issue, everyone likely hopes the RKP and APBN will be issued soon.
Even if there are issues beyond administration, the public has to be informed on substantive issues, such as the process of rearranging government priorities, negotiations between institutions within a shrinking fiscal space, and fiscal caution in the face of economic uncertainty. These three issues are not mutually exclusive and can occur simultaneously.
Now, with only a few weeks left in 2025, the question shifts from normative to practical: what happens if the year ends without formal promulgation?
The Constitution provides guidance only for a scenario where parliament rejects the Draft Budget; in which case the government shall run on the previous year’s budget. But that is not the case here; the DPR has approved the state budget plan, but it has not been promulgated.
Given that other national planning documents have also been promulgated past their statutory deadlines (such as the RPJMN and RKP), it is not hard to imagine that late promulgation will not trigger administrative complications.
But if the APBN is delayed, the Presidential Regulation on Budget Details will likely be delayed as well. This would push back the promulgation of the budget execution lists, which the Finance Ministry requires to be finalized by December before the new fiscal year begins.
Ideally, these administrative issues should not delay the execution of government programs–especially those that directly benefit the public.
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