Prabowo’s self-fulfilling disaster relief plan, patriotic or biased?
Unpacking the cognitive biases behind Sumatra’s lackluster disaster response
The author is a behavioural scientist and researcher. She is a PhD candidate at the University of Tasmania and founder of Advislab, a behavioural insights consulting firm. This article reflects the author’s own analysis and views and does not necessarily represent those of The Reformist.
Despite having displaced more than 800 thousand citizens, a number comparable to the 2004 Aceh tsunami, President Prabowo Subianto insisted that the ecological disaster currently affecting the Aceh and West Sumatera region should not be declared as a national disaster emergency.
His decision has been criticized by many. Even more after he was adamant about rejecting foreign aid, asserting that the Indonesian government has everything under control. This approach paints a stark difference compared to the 2004 tsunami response framework, when then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduced the “Open Sky Policy”, opening the region’s airspace and waters for international relief flights and ships.
In Indonesia’s disaster-management framework, declaring the disaster as a national emergency would allow the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB) to obtain facilitated access to mobilisation of personnel, equipment, logistics, emergency procurement, emergency financial management, as well as command authority to instruct other governmental agencies. Given this ability, why did the President shy away from enacting an emergency declaration despite pleas from various stakeholders, including those most affected?
Years of research in the field of behavioural science may explain the drivers behind this decision. In this article, I will explore the President’s actions, or rather inactions, through this particular lens.
What the cognitive bias lens tells us about Prabowo’s ‘controversial’ disaster relief approach
To begin, humans are prone to cognitive biases, defined as systematic errors in thinking that may influence their judgments, decisions, and sometimes perceptions of reality. While cognitive biases may aid individuals in making swift decisions amidst time constraints, they often result in flawed decision-making, particularly in complex situations like disaster response.
First, the President may have overweighted the government’s capacity to handle things while simultaneously underestimating compounding bottlenecks, such as access risk, sanitation risk, disease risk, or other secondary hazards. This is an example of overconfidence, a cognitive bias characterized with believing we are more capable than we actually are – or at least more capable than our peers.
Aligned with this, individuals are also prone to optimism bias. Under stress, optimistic forecasts might become aspirational: believing conditions will normalise quickly despite conditions in the field suggesting otherwise.
Second, the President may see the declaration of a national emergency as admitting failure. Throughout his campaign, sovereignty and national capability have been salient identity themes. Hence, evidence may have been filtered through that lens: accepting foreign aid is interpreted as weakness or loss of control, so counterevidence is discounted.
Confirmation bias may also persist. In the age of algorithms and echo chambers, we tend to only look for and believe in evidence that supports our pre-established belief. The President may only “see” indicators that support control, such as filtered reports from loyal chains of command, which may not show the whole picture. Disconfirming signals from NGOs, local officials, media, or the people could be ignored and labeled as “noise” or “politicized”.
Lastly, the government may anchor on certain selected thresholds. Even with 800 thousand displaced, the President hinges on a particular metric favourable to his view, such as noting how the disaster ‘only’ happened in 3 out of 38 provinces. Doing so treats everything else, including the number of fatalities, displaced people, and disease risk-individuals, as secondary.
Behaviourally-informed ways that may assist in suppressing cognitive biases in this case
First, the declaration of national emergency could be framed as a time-limited administrative escalation to provide ease of access for BNPB and other relevant authorities. Making it time-limited shows that the declaration is simply for administrative and bureaucratic purposes in an emergency, instead of declaring governmental “defeat” or incompetence.
Second, a short set of triggers can be set, derived from the rapid assessment domains in Indonesia’s disaster-management framework. For example, if X or Y indicators exceed a certain threshold, the disaster status is automatically escalated for a set number of days, and will be reviewed regularly.
Third, as already urged by several civil society organizations, the President can set up a temporary office in the affected region. When local leaders report fuel, food, and clean-water shortages and blocked logistics, those signals must reach the head of state without being softened, so he knows what is at stake.
On top of the official dashboard, a secondary dissent dashboard can be set up, where reports from non-governmental sources, such as hospitals, logistic operators, and NGOs can directly reach the President. This may reduce confirmation bias and hierarchical filtering, which plenty of media outlets suggest are happening at the moment.
Fourth, if refusal to accept foreign aid is driven by identity and reactance, a constrained foreign aid option that preserves control can be proposed. For instance, aid has to be time-limited, government-led, and only targeted to logistics gaps, where the rest of the disaster management aspects are still handled by the government and local organisations.
Lastly, the President could have shown a genuine display of leadership by personally leading the disaster response, declaring a national emergency, only, as a tool to accelerate logistics coordination. The optics would have gone in his favor and it would have been a great show of strength, contrary to what the President may believe in. This approach could have perched him as a respectable leader he has long aspired to be. Conversely, sticking to hollow patriotic jargons without personally leading the nation through this disaster signals the notion that he’s only been yearning for the “President” title, not the job itself.
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"Lastly, the President could have shown a genuine display of leadership by personally leading the disaster response, declaring a national emergency, only, as a tool to accelerate logistics coordination. The optics would have gone in his favor and it would have been a great show of strength, contrary to what the President may believe in. This approach could have perched him as a respectable leader he has long aspired to be. Conversely, sticking to hollow patriotic jargons without personally leading the nation through this disaster signals the notion that he’s only been yearning for the “President” title, not the job itself."
You did not pull any punches. Well-said!
I listened to a podcast not long ago, which said that two markers equally important in leadership are autonomy and the humility to seek input. They may seem paradoxical, but together they signal maturity. And somehow, I feel like the humility to seek input/help can be seen as a weakness for some people. Or a friend said, "maybe he doesn't want to feel indebted to anyone".