Now is the time to reform Indonesia’s Hajj management
The window has opened for major changes to finally take place
The author is a public policy researcher and MEL practitioner with an urban planning background, focusing on governance reform and urban development in Indonesia. He also leads the PMEL team in Think Policy. This article reflects the author’s own analysis and views and does not necessarily represent those of The Reformist or Think Policy.
Early in the year, the push to reform Indonesia’s Hajj (annual Islamic pilgrimage) management has resurfaced, once again, due to a scandal. The Corruption Eradication Committee has recently named two new suspects in the Hajj quota corruption case, including former Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas. As a refresher, throughout 2023–2024, investigators uncovered inflated costs and irregularities tied to the allocation of additional Hajj quotas: seats meant for regular pilgrims were diverted, and subsidies were distorted.
Public trust towards the country’s Hajj management took another hit. To many Indonesian Muslims, this is less about lost funds, and more about their rights being violated by the very people they have entrusted with their very sacred (and costly) obligation.
Last year, a window opened for reforms to reshape the entire Hajj management system as the new ‘Hajj Law’ (Law No. 14/2025) passed, forming a new Hajj Ministry. I was hopeful to see changes considering, for decades of sending the biggest group of pilgrims every year, the Religious Affairs Ministry’s governance of Hajj was plagued with chronic problems: from long waiting times and declining health of elderly pilgrims, to financial obscurity and recurring errors in data management.
Over the years, watching how the Hajj process unfolds up close, it becomes clear that these issues are not isolated incidents. As the call for better Hajj governance has become more timely than ever, this article will attempt to provide insights on what could be done to improve the notoriously problematic Hajj management in Indonesia, now that a new ministry is in charge specifically for it.
However, before getting into the solution, I’d like to open by outlining four core problems that have been plaguing Indonesia’s Hajj management.
Four core, stubborn Hajj management problems
1. Long waiting list
The biggest issue in Hajj management is the long waiting list. Every year, Saudi Arabia gives Indonesia the largest share of quotas, but it is still not enough.
In some provinces, the wait can stretch for more than 20 years. In an extreme case, one district in South Sulawesi reportedly faced a 47 years waiting time for regular quotas. As a result, many Indonesians who register in their thirties and forties only get to leave when they are already elderly.
Data from the Religious Affairs Ministry shows that a large share of waiting pilgrims are 60–79 years old or above, whose health often declines once it’s their turn to attend the pilgrimage that requires walking long distances, staying in crowded places, and enduring desert heat. Saudi officials even say our system is “sending pilgrims to death,” because so many pilgrims are no longer strong enough when their turn finally arrives.
The mismatch between waiting times and life expectancy has become one of the hardest truths of today’s pilgrimage.
2. Opaque Hajj deposit fund management
Millions of people pay deposits and fees every year, so the government is handling an enormous sum of money. By the end of 2024, the Hajj Fund Management Agency (‘BPKH’) reported to have managed Rp 171.65 trillion of funds. In 2025, it is targeting Rp 11 trillion in investment returns from those deposits.
Naturally, the public wants to know how those funds are invested, how the returns are used, and who benefits. Yet that clarity is often missing. Pilgrims still face unanswered questions about quota distribution, contract negotiations in Saudi Arabia, and management of pilgrim data.
Reports from past seasons reveal recurring mistakes: double entries in payment records, mismatched flight manifests, and delays in visa processing. In 2023, for example, hundreds of pilgrims were left behind because their data was not properly synced with Saudi systems, despite having completed all payments. Some errors may be unavoidable at this scale, but without openness they easily create distrust.
3. Weak data system meets Saudi’s messy syarikah policies
However, much of the complexity in Hajj management comes down to Saudi Arabia’s own policies. The syarikah system, which assigns different contractors to handle accommodation, transport, meals, and guidance, was supposed to streamline services but often does the opposite.
In 2025, more than five different syarikah were tasked with Indonesian pilgrims. Instead of bringing order, this division created fresh problems, especially when combined with Indonesia’s weak data systems. Families were split across providers, spouses and elderly companions were separated, and service quality varied widely depending on which syarikah was in charge.
The situation grew even more difficult when Saudi authorities abruptly canceled the special ‘Furoda Hajj’ visa, which allows pilgrims to pay more to get a Hajj invitation from the Saudi government that is not taking up the national quota, just days before departure. As a result, thousands of Indonesians were unable to travel despite already securing accommodation. This decision showed how vulnerable Indonesia remains to last-minute policy shifts beyond its control.
This problem is one of the most critical issues addressed by Indonesian pilgrims in 2025.
4. Rampant corruption
As if logistical and structural problems were not enough, corruption has added salt to the wound. KPK has uncovered inflated travel costs in the 2023–2024 Hajj period tied to the allocation of an additional 20,000 quota seats.
By law, 92 percent of those seats should have gone to regular Hajj participants, but authorities split them evenly between regular and special packages. This misallocation drained state funds and cut into subsidies for many regular pilgrims. The KPK has now named former Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas a suspect in this case, along with another senior official within the ministry under his tenure.
These problems show that the Hajj management system suffers not only from external pressures but also from internal weaknesses. When poor oversight at home collides with unpredictable policies abroad, pilgrims bear the brunt.
The 2025 Hajj once again demonstrated how dependent Indonesia remains on Saudi’s decisions and how fragile the system is without stronger coordination, greater transparency, and better bargaining power.
It all boils down to the big question:
How, then, should management change?
It was against these long-standing problems that the new Hajj law was passed. For 75 years, the Religious Affairs Ministry has overseen Hajj. But with the new Hajj Law , major reforms are now underway. The new law not only responds to long-standing problems but also restructures how Hajj and Umrah (minor pilgrimage) are managed.
The new law introduces nine important points:
Forming a dedicated Hajj Ministry to manage both Hajj and Umrah to ensure direct accountability and authority on its management.
Development of a Hajj–Umrah ecosystem through new working units, state service agency (BLU) financial management, and cooperation with relevant partners.
Separate quotas for officials and pilgrims so staff allocations no longer reduce the public quota.
Regulation of additional quotas to maximize Indonesia’s access to Hajj slots.
Clear rules on leftover quotas to prevent wasted slots.
Tighter supervision of “Special Hajj” for pilgrims using non-quota visas.
Defined responsibilities for spiritual and health guidance to ensure adequate preparation and care.
Transition mechanisms to smooth the institutional shift from the old structure to the new one.
An integrated information system to improve data management for hajj and umrah
These changes show that the government is not simply reshuffling bureaucracy with this new law, but trying to address specific weaknesses such as quota distribution, financial clarity, health support, and data transparency.
But the critical question remains: do these nine points meaningfully address the real problems pilgrims face, or do they merely rearrange responsibilities without fixing the underlying system?
In the next section, I will examine what issues these reforms actually tackle, what they leave unresolved, and whether this package of changes is sufficient to improve hajj management in practice.
What the nine points addressed
For the first time, the Ministry of Religious Affairs will no longer run Hajj. Its role shifts back to regulating religious affairs, while a new Ministry of Hajj and Umrah takes over logistics, quotas, health, and guidance. Centralizing these tasks should bring clarity after years of overlap that previously involved multiple agencies like the Ministry, BPKH, and others.
The newly running ministry has started to manage operations on 2026’s Hajj events while also starting to apply quota reform with uniform waiting times.
But the transition’s success depends on two things: whether the shifting of responsibilities goes smoothly and whether the new one can build capacity fast enough to serve millions of pilgrims.
When the law was passed, Law Minister Supratman Andi Atgas, speaking for President Prabowo Subianto, emphasized that reform was meant to strengthen state responsibility for a sacred duty that touches millions of Indonesians.
The expectation is clear: a more unified management system, stronger quota arrangements, better guidance, and more reliable data.
What they didn’t
Still, not every problem is addressed. Oversight and public communication on millions of deposit money, data management, and transparency on quota deals are still weak.
Indonesia’s limited bargaining power with the Saudi government has also not been addressed, leaving Indonesia dependent on arrangements that are not always clear or favorable.
At the end of the day, Indonesians want a hajj that is not only efficient but also dignified.
What to do to ensure management improves
The next step is to make sure these changes happen. A stronger ministry-led system will only succeed if it is transparent, coordinated, and responsive to the needs of pilgrims (especially the elderly) while preserving the spiritual meaning of Hajj.
Four things stand out in public expectations:
Transparency: Clear information about quotas, finances, and contracts.
Care for the elderly: Services must be designed to provide health facilities and mobility assistance for mostly elderly pilgrims.
Quality delivery: Standardized delivery for accommodation, meals, and transportation.
Spiritual focus: Pilgrims should be able to focus on their pilgrimage; not be overwhelmed with logistical chaos.
Hajj remains one of the most important milestones in the life of an Indonesian Muslim, yet it is also among the most demanding tasks the state must deliver. Each year, it involves millions of families and directly affects nearly 10 percent of the population.
With a new law and dedicated ministry, Indonesia now has both a legal and institutional foundation to push these improvements forward. These are not just technical fixes; they signal an attempt to make Hajj more transparent, elderly-friendly, and spiritually meaningful.
However, success will depend on whether policymakers and institutions can translate legal commitments into practice. If the reforms are carried through with competence and integrity, Indonesian pilgrims will no longer be burdened by uncertainty (or inefficiency) so they can fulfill their sacred duty with dignity and peace of mind.
Even though creating a new ministry may pose a burden for an already bloated bureaucracy, that is a different evaluation for another day.
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