
Amid the escalating controversy over his high school diploma, Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka resigned on 12 November 2026, leaving a vacuum at the top of Indonesia’s executive branch.
A lot has already been said — and will continue to be — about the political theater and legal maneuvers surrounding his departure. So rather than relitigating how we got here, the more urgent national conversation must center on where we go from here.
Specifically, what must Indonesia’s next vice president bring to the table?
Article 8(2) of the 1945 Constitution clearly laid out the mechanism for filling a vacant vice-presidential seat: within sixty days, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) must convene to vote on a replacement from two candidates nominated directly by the president.
On paper, this sets the stage for high-stakes political horse-trading. In practice, President Prabowo Subianto finds himself in an unusually permissive political environment.
Backed by a sprawling, big-tent coalition, Prabowo faces remarkably little internal friction over the nomination. Curiously, many of the major coalition party leaders have publicly signaled their disinterest in claiming the second-highest office in the land. Whether this reluctance stems from a cold calculation that tying themselves too closely to the current administration could drag down their electoral prospects in 2029 is a question for another day. What matters right now is the strategic opportunity this creates: Prabowo has the political latitude to nominate virtually whomever he wants without risking significant blowback from his parliamentary allies.
That rare freedom comes with immense responsibility, though. By constitutional design, the Indonesian vice presidency is a notoriously ambiguous office. Beyond serving as a “spare tire,” a designated replacement should the president be unable to fulfill their duties, the Constitution offers little specificity, noting only in Article 4(2) that the president is assisted by one vice president.
Historically, a vice president holds no independent executive authority unless the president explicitly delegates it. Yet, given the mounting pressures facing this administration, Prabowo cannot afford to treat this nomination as a ceremonial reward or a purely symbolic balancing act.
If this government is to regain its footing, we believe the next vice president must fulfill three critical functions.
First, the VP must be someone undeniably ready to assume the presidency at a moment’s notice. It is an uncomfortable topic in Indonesian political culture, and certainly no one wishes ill health upon the head of state, but President Prabowo is in his mid-seventies. The primary constitutional raison d’être of a vice president is to guarantee seamless continuity of governance if the unthinkable occurs. For the past two years, that safety net has felt precarious.
Replacing Gibran cannot be another gamble on political pedigree or untested potential. The markets, the bureaucracy, and the public need the assurance that the person sitting a heartbeat away from the presidency possesses the temperament, statecraft, and institutional legitimacy to lead the world’s fourth-most populous nation on day one, without a learning curve.
Second, the new vice president must take seriously the constitutional mandate to “assist the president.” Indonesia’s presidential system vests both the role of head of state and head of government in a single individual: the president. It has become increasingly evident that President Prabowo gravitates far more toward the grander, outward-facing duties of a head of state — championing foreign policy, projecting national strength, and setting sweeping ideological visions — than the granular, day-to-day grind of a head of government.
During the previous administration, this structural gap was partially bridged, albeit unofficially, by a powerful coordinating minister, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, whom politicians and journalists often referred to as the Jokowi government’s de facto prime minister, knocking heads across ministries and ensuring presidential directives actually materialized. The current administration has lacked such a centralizing operator, leaving a bloated cabinet that too often pulls in competing directions. The incoming vice president must step into this void. Prabowo needs a disciplined, detail-oriented partner who thrives on bureaucratic execution, resolves inter-ministerial gridlock, and translates broad presidential ambitions into coherent, workable policy.
Third, the next vice president must revive and institutionalize rigorous “policy monitoring and evaluation.” Too many flagship programs in this administration have suffered not necessarily from a lack of funding or political will, but from sloppy execution, overlapping jurisdictions, and zero accountability when targets are missed.
We need look no further than our own history to see what effective oversight looks like. During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4), led by the late Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, served as the administration’s nervous system: tracking bottlenecks, auditing ministerial performance with cold data, and ensuring policies delivered tangible results on the ground.
This governance model we unpacked at length in an earlier The Reformist Podcast episode with former UKP4 deputy Yanuar Nugroho:
While the statutory wording around “monitoring and evaluation” often mirrors the duties of regional deputies, the vice president is uniquely positioned at the national level to house a modern equivalent of that delivery unit. By taking ownership of policy auditing and delivery, the new vice president can give the administration the self-correcting mechanism it so desperately lacks.
The stakes of this decision could not be higher. With public approval ratings dipping to levels rarely seen since the Reformasi era, the honeymoon period is not just over but has soured into widespread public skepticism. Economic headwinds, perceived policy missteps, and institutional fatigue have eroded the immense political capital Prabowo enjoyed upon taking office.
Because his coalition partners have largely stepped aside from the race, Prabowo cannot blame political compromises for the names he eventually sends to the MPR. This choice will be entirely his own. Selecting a seasoned, operationally ruthless, and credible vice president will not magically solve every structural challenge facing Indonesia. However, it will send an unmistakable signal that the president recognizes his administration’s vulnerabilities and is finally ready to bring in a partner who complements his strengths and covers his blind spots.

